AS COURSE DESIGNER/PRIMARY INSTRUCTOR
DUTIES TO THE SELF
University of Groningen, 2021
Syllabus
Course description:
The topic of duties to oneself is currently experiencing a resurgence in philosophy. In the last few decades, philosophers tended to assume that morality is only concerned with how we relate to others. Accordingly, they tended to neglect, if not deny, the traditional idea that we might also owe things to ourselves, and that morality might require us to treat ourselves with care and dignity. In recent years, however, several philosophers have begun to explore this side of morality again.
This course will introduce students to these recent contributions to the literature, relate them to their historical predecessors, and critically assess their philosophical merit.
The main goal is that students acquire knowledge of the debate about duties to oneself as well as the skill to apply key concepts from ethical theory more generally. In addition, students will gain competence in analysing, constructing, and critically assessing philosophical arguments.
Syllabus
Course description:
The topic of duties to oneself is currently experiencing a resurgence in philosophy. In the last few decades, philosophers tended to assume that morality is only concerned with how we relate to others. Accordingly, they tended to neglect, if not deny, the traditional idea that we might also owe things to ourselves, and that morality might require us to treat ourselves with care and dignity. In recent years, however, several philosophers have begun to explore this side of morality again.
This course will introduce students to these recent contributions to the literature, relate them to their historical predecessors, and critically assess their philosophical merit.
The main goal is that students acquire knowledge of the debate about duties to oneself as well as the skill to apply key concepts from ethical theory more generally. In addition, students will gain competence in analysing, constructing, and critically assessing philosophical arguments.
CRITIQUES OF LIBERALISM
University of Groningen, 2021, co-taught with Michael Gregory
Course description:
Liberalism has been the dominant position Western political philosophy and politics for at least half a century. Yet, it has come under heavy fire in recent decades. For example, communitarians argue that liberalism is too individualistic, feminists criticize it for its alleged lack of sensitivity towards unjust social norms, and neo-republicans accuse it of having an overly narrow conception of freedom. These alleged shortcomings of liberalism are sometimes blamed for the recent surge of populist movements in the West.
In this course, we will assess liberalism in light of these and other criticisms. In the process, we will distinguish various themes and currents within liberal thought. One of the overarching aims of this course is to determine what the alternatives to liberalism might be, and whether some form of liberalism is still worth defending.
Course description:
Liberalism has been the dominant position Western political philosophy and politics for at least half a century. Yet, it has come under heavy fire in recent decades. For example, communitarians argue that liberalism is too individualistic, feminists criticize it for its alleged lack of sensitivity towards unjust social norms, and neo-republicans accuse it of having an overly narrow conception of freedom. These alleged shortcomings of liberalism are sometimes blamed for the recent surge of populist movements in the West.
In this course, we will assess liberalism in light of these and other criticisms. In the process, we will distinguish various themes and currents within liberal thought. One of the overarching aims of this course is to determine what the alternatives to liberalism might be, and whether some form of liberalism is still worth defending.
WHY DEMOCRACY?
UCL, 2020
Module decription:
This course focuses on ethical and philosophical approaches to democracy. It will introduce students to major arguments for and against democracy. Among others, we will engage with the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Rousseau, Madison, Mill and Habermas. The theories and arguments covered in this course are captured by the following themes: expertise; civic dignity and human flourishing; individual liberty; collective self-rule; participation; representation; public deliberation; equality; borders.
Module decription:
This course focuses on ethical and philosophical approaches to democracy. It will introduce students to major arguments for and against democracy. Among others, we will engage with the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Rousseau, Madison, Mill and Habermas. The theories and arguments covered in this course are captured by the following themes: expertise; civic dignity and human flourishing; individual liberty; collective self-rule; participation; representation; public deliberation; equality; borders.
HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN
UCL, 2020
Module decription:
This course focuses on the question of what it means to be a human being and what it means to be a citizen. It does so by engaging with the political philosophy of liberalism and its critics. Liberalism has been the dominant position in political philosophy for at least half a century. Yet, liberalism has come under heavy fire in recent decades. Often, liberalism is criticised for paying insufficient attention to what it means to be a human being and a citizen. For example, communitarians argue that liberalism is too individualistic and thus neglects the importance of community in human life. These alleged shortcomings of liberalism are sometimes blamed for the recent surge of populist movements in the West.
In this course, we will assess liberalism in light of these and other criticisms. In the process, we will distinguish various themes and currents within liberal thought. One of the overarching aims of this course is to determine what, if any, conception of human beings and citizens liberalism employs, and whether this conception does justice to human nature and political reality.
Module decription:
This course focuses on the question of what it means to be a human being and what it means to be a citizen. It does so by engaging with the political philosophy of liberalism and its critics. Liberalism has been the dominant position in political philosophy for at least half a century. Yet, liberalism has come under heavy fire in recent decades. Often, liberalism is criticised for paying insufficient attention to what it means to be a human being and a citizen. For example, communitarians argue that liberalism is too individualistic and thus neglects the importance of community in human life. These alleged shortcomings of liberalism are sometimes blamed for the recent surge of populist movements in the West.
In this course, we will assess liberalism in light of these and other criticisms. In the process, we will distinguish various themes and currents within liberal thought. One of the overarching aims of this course is to determine what, if any, conception of human beings and citizens liberalism employs, and whether this conception does justice to human nature and political reality.
INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
UCL, 2019
Module decription:
In this course, we investigate three large sets of questions about justice and the importance of liberty and equality for a just society:
(1) Liberty: What is liberty and why is it important? Which liberties, if any, should a just society protect? Freedom of expression? Freedom from interference? Economic Liberty? Sexual liberty? Political liberty? Can these different liberties come into conflict, and if so, should some have priority over others?
(2) Equality: What is equality, is it important, and which kinds of equality, if any, should a just society ensure? Equality of opportunity? Equality of income and wealth? Political equality?
(3) Reconciliation: Can a society ensure the equality and liberty of its citizens at the same time, or are these political values inherently in conflict with one another? If they are conflicting values, which is to take priority?
To facilitate our investigation, we will examine three theories of justice: utilitarianism, libertarianism, and liberal egalitarianism. These three theories do not represent an exhaustive set of answers to our questions, but these three views are central to much of contemporary political philosophy, and they shape political thinking outside of philosophy as well.
Module decription:
In this course, we investigate three large sets of questions about justice and the importance of liberty and equality for a just society:
(1) Liberty: What is liberty and why is it important? Which liberties, if any, should a just society protect? Freedom of expression? Freedom from interference? Economic Liberty? Sexual liberty? Political liberty? Can these different liberties come into conflict, and if so, should some have priority over others?
(2) Equality: What is equality, is it important, and which kinds of equality, if any, should a just society ensure? Equality of opportunity? Equality of income and wealth? Political equality?
(3) Reconciliation: Can a society ensure the equality and liberty of its citizens at the same time, or are these political values inherently in conflict with one another? If they are conflicting values, which is to take priority?
To facilitate our investigation, we will examine three theories of justice: utilitarianism, libertarianism, and liberal egalitarianism. These three theories do not represent an exhaustive set of answers to our questions, but these three views are central to much of contemporary political philosophy, and they shape political thinking outside of philosophy as well.
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
University of Bayreuth, 2018
Module decription from the department's website:
What are the psychological processes involved in making a moral judgment? What is a moral agent? What are the conditions under which we are morally responsible for our actions? Are psychopaths moral agents? Can robots be held morally responsible?
Questions like these used to be the subject of philosophical inquiry alone. Accordingly, theories of moral psychology were developed in lockstep with theories of normative ethics and metaethics. However, recent decades have seen the emergence of a vast literature on empirical moral psychology, i.e., the study of morality with the methods of cognitive science.
In this seminar, we will take a look at some of the most influential work in empirical moral psychology. By evaluating the philosophical merit of this work, we will try to determine what empirical moral psychology can teach us about the nature of morality.
Module decription from the department's website:
What are the psychological processes involved in making a moral judgment? What is a moral agent? What are the conditions under which we are morally responsible for our actions? Are psychopaths moral agents? Can robots be held morally responsible?
Questions like these used to be the subject of philosophical inquiry alone. Accordingly, theories of moral psychology were developed in lockstep with theories of normative ethics and metaethics. However, recent decades have seen the emergence of a vast literature on empirical moral psychology, i.e., the study of morality with the methods of cognitive science.
In this seminar, we will take a look at some of the most influential work in empirical moral psychology. By evaluating the philosophical merit of this work, we will try to determine what empirical moral psychology can teach us about the nature of morality.
MORALITY, IDENTITY, AND COMMITMENT
University of Bayreuth, 2017
Module decription from the department's website:
We commonly assume that, when deciding what to do, we are justified in assigning a certain priority to the projects and relationships to which we are personally committed. For example, when faced with the decision between saving a loved one and saving a complete stranger, most of us would assert that we have a right, if not a duty, to save our loved one. However, modern ethical theories typically demand that we deliberate from a standpoint of impartiality.
This apparent conflict is but one indicator of the complex and difficult-to-trace connections between morality, identity, and commitment with which this seminar will be concerned. Questions to be addressed include (but are not exhausted by) the following:
Is there a limit to what morality can demand of us? In particular, can morality legitimately demand that we attach no special weight to those personal projects and relationships that we deem central to our identity? If not, should we give up the notion that morality ‘trumps’ all other practical considerations? Or is there perhaps no real conflict between morality and concern for our personal commitments in the first place? Indeed, might the integrity of the individual not be the very foundation of morality? Does this mean that we can only ever have normative reason to do what we can be motivated to do, given our current projects and relationships? Or does morality provide normative reasons independently of our motivational states? What are the conceptions of practical reason invoked in this debate?
We will approach these questions through the work of Bernard Williams, Peter Singer, Christine Korsgaard, and others.
The aim of the seminar is to make students familiar with some of the philosophical problems associated with the above questions, as well as some of the arguments that have been proposed to solve them. Methodologically, students should improve their ability to understand, critically discuss, and present their own thoughts on philosophical questions.
Module decription from the department's website:
We commonly assume that, when deciding what to do, we are justified in assigning a certain priority to the projects and relationships to which we are personally committed. For example, when faced with the decision between saving a loved one and saving a complete stranger, most of us would assert that we have a right, if not a duty, to save our loved one. However, modern ethical theories typically demand that we deliberate from a standpoint of impartiality.
This apparent conflict is but one indicator of the complex and difficult-to-trace connections between morality, identity, and commitment with which this seminar will be concerned. Questions to be addressed include (but are not exhausted by) the following:
Is there a limit to what morality can demand of us? In particular, can morality legitimately demand that we attach no special weight to those personal projects and relationships that we deem central to our identity? If not, should we give up the notion that morality ‘trumps’ all other practical considerations? Or is there perhaps no real conflict between morality and concern for our personal commitments in the first place? Indeed, might the integrity of the individual not be the very foundation of morality? Does this mean that we can only ever have normative reason to do what we can be motivated to do, given our current projects and relationships? Or does morality provide normative reasons independently of our motivational states? What are the conceptions of practical reason invoked in this debate?
We will approach these questions through the work of Bernard Williams, Peter Singer, Christine Korsgaard, and others.
The aim of the seminar is to make students familiar with some of the philosophical problems associated with the above questions, as well as some of the arguments that have been proposed to solve them. Methodologically, students should improve their ability to understand, critically discuss, and present their own thoughts on philosophical questions.