ARTICLES AND BOOK CHAPTERS
“Second-personal approaches to moral obligation.” philosophy compass 18(3), 2023: E12901.
According to second-personal approaches to moral obligation, the distinctive normative features of moral obligation can only be explained in terms of second-personal relations, i.e. the distinctive way persons relate to each other as persons. But there are important disagreements between different groups of second-personal approaches. Most notably, they disagree about the nature of second-personal relations, which has consequences for the nature of the obligations that they purport to explain. This article aims to distinguish these groups from each other, highlight their respective advantages and disadvantages, and thereby indicate avenues for future research.
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“MORAL OBLIGATION: RELATIONAL OR SECOND-PERSONAL?” ERGo 9(48), 2023.
The Problem of Obligation is the problem of how to explain the features of moral obligations that distinguish them from other normative phenomena. Two recent accounts, the Second-Personal Account and the Relational Account, propose superficially similar solutions to this problem. Both regard obligations as based on the claims or legitimate demands that persons as such have on one another. However, unlike the Second-Personal Account, the Relational Account does not regard these claims as based in persons’ authority to address them. Advocates of the Relational Account accuse the Second-Personal Account of falling prey to the Problem of Antecedence. According to this objection, the Second-Personal Account is committed to the implausible claim that we have an obligation to φ only if, and because, others demand that we φ. Since the Relational Account’s proposed solution to the Problem of Obligation does not face the Problem of Antecedence, its advocates argue that it is dialectically superior to the Second-Personal Account. In this paper, I defend the Second-Personal Account by arguing that, first, the Relational Account does not actually solve the Problem of Obligation and, second, the Second-Personal Account does not fall prey to the Problem of Antecedence.
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“CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND RATIONAL CRITIQUE: A KANTIAN PROCEDURAL APPROACH.” INQUIRY 2022 (ONLINE FIRST).
The bottom line of the philosophical debate about conspiracy theories is that it is difficult to condemn belief in conspiracy theories as rationally criticisable in general. Yet, we should not give up on the project of providing a general rational critique of such belief, not least because of the threat it poses to society. For this reason, I outline a new kind of approach that aims to show that conspiracy theories are rationally criticisable in general: a procedural approach. Unlike most philosophical approaches, a procedural approach does not purport to condemn conspiracy theorists directly on the basis of features of their theories. Instead, it focuses on the patterns of thought involved in forming and sustaining belief in such theories. Yet, unlike psychological approaches, a procedural approach provides a rational critique of conspiracist thought patterns. In particular, it criticises these thought patterns for failing to conform to procedures prescribed by reason. The specific procedural approach that I want to develop takes its cue from the Kantian notion that reason must be used self-critically. I argue that conspiracy theorists fail to engage in the relevant sort of self-critique in at least three ways: they do not critically examine their own motivations, they avoid looking at matters from the point of view of others, and they fail to reflect on the limits of human knowledge.
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“KANTIAN CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY.” KANT YEARBOOK 14(1), 2022: 97-120.
While it is uncontroversial that Kantian constructivism has implications for normative ethics, its status as a metaethical view has been contested. In this article, I provide a characterisation of metaethical Kantian constructivism that withstands these criticisms. I start by offering a partial defence of Sharon Street’s practical standpoint characterisation. However, I argue that this characterisation, as presented by Street, is ultimately incomplete because it fails to demonstrate that the claims of Kantian constructivism constitute a distinctive contribution to metaethics. I then try to complete the practical standpoint characterisation by elaborating on Christine Korsgaard’s suggestion that metaethical Kantian constructivism takes up a position on the source of morality’s normativity.
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“KANT ON AUTONOMY OF THE WILL,” IN BEN COLBURN (ED.), THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF AUTONOMY, 2022: 45-55.
Kant takes the idea of autonomy of the will to be his distinctive contribution to moral philosophy. However, this idea is more nuanced and complicated than one might think. In this chapter, I sketch the rough outlines of Kant’s idea of autonomy of the will while also highlighting contentious exegetical issues that give rise to various possible interpretations. I tentatively defend four basic claims. First, autonomy primarily features in Kant’s account of moral agency, as the condition of the possibility of moral obligation. Second, autonomy amounts to a metaphysical property as well as a normative principle and a psychological capacity. Third, although there is legitimate scholarly disagreement about whether or not autonomy involves self-legislation of the moral law, there is good reason to believe it underwrites an ‘inside-out’ (as opposed to ‘outside-in’) conception of the relationship between the will and moral requirements. Fourth, persons have dignity because their autonomy makes them members in the set of beings over whom the categorical imperative requires us to universalise our maxims, not because autonomy is an independently important property.
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“KANT AND THE SECOND PERSON.” JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION 7(4), 2021: 494-513.
According to Darwall’s Second-Personal Account, moral obligations constitutively involve relations of authority and accountability between persons. Darwall takes this account to lend support to Kant’s moral theory. Critics object that the Second-Personal Account abandons central tenets of Kant’s system. I respond to these critics’ three main challenges by showing that they rest on misunderstandings of the Second-Personal Account. Properly understood, this account is not only congenial to Kant’s moral theory, but also illuminates aspects of that theory which have hitherto received scant attention. In particular, it motivates a fresh perspective on the relationship between respect, persons, and the law.
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“ON THE SUPPOSED INCOHERENCE OF OBLIGATIONS TO ONESELF.” AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 99(1), 2021: 175-189.
An influential argument against the possibility of obligations to oneself states that the very notion of such obligations is incoherent: If there were such obligations, we could release ourselves from them; yet releasing oneself from an obligation is impossible. I challenge this argument by arguing against the premise that it is impossible to release oneself from an obligation. I point out that this premise assumes that if it were possible to release oneself from an obligation, it would be impossible to violate that obligation. I note that there are two interpretations of this assumption, one conceptual and one psychological. I argue that, on both interpretations, the assumption is false—at least according to independently plausible accounts of obligations to oneself and of what it means to waive an obligation. My arguments paint a picture of obligations to oneself that not only challenges the argument against their coherence, but also illuminates these obligations’ relationship to other parts of the moral domain.
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Also check out Paul Schofield's reply!
(AVAILABLE HERE; ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT)
Also check out Paul Schofield's reply!
“COMMITMENT AND THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT.” ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG 73(4), 2019: 511-32.
On Chang’s voluntarist account of commitments, when we commit to φ, we employ the ‘normative powers’ of our will to give ourselves a reason to φ that we would otherwise not have. I argue that Chang’s account, by itself, does not have sufficient conceptual resources to reconcile the fundamentally volitional character of commitments with their alleged normative significance. I suggest an alternative, second-personal account of commitment, which avoids this problem. On this account, the volitional act involved in committing is one of holding ourselves accountable, thus putting us under to a pro tanto obligation to ourselves. The second-personal account implies that there is an interesting link between commitment and morality.
(AVAILABLE HERE; ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT)
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“WHY IT IS DISRESPECTFUL TO VIOLATE RIGHTS: CONTRACTUALISM AND THE KIND-DESIRE THEORY.” PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 175(1), 2018: 97-116.
The most prominent theories of rights, the Will Theory and the Interest Theory, notoriously fail to accommodate all and only rights-attributions that make sense to ordinary speakers. The Kind-Desire Theory, Leif Wenar’s recent contribution to the field, appears to fare better in this respect than any of its predecessors. The theory states that we attribute a right to an individual if she has a kind-based desire that a certain enforceable duty be fulfilled. A kind-based desire is a reason to want something which one has simply in virtue of being a member of a certain kind. Rowan Cruft objects that this theory creates a puzzle about the relation between rights and respect. In particular, if rights are not grounded in aspects of the particular individuals whose rights they are (e.g., their well-being), how can we sustain the intuitive notion that to violate a right is to disrespect the right-holder? I present a contractualist account of respect which reconciles the Kind-Desire Theory with the intuition that rights-violations are disrespectful. On this account, respect for a person is a matter of acknowledging her legitimate authority to make demands on the will and conduct of others. And I argue that kind-based desires authorize a person to make demands even if they do not correspond to that person’s well-being or other non-relational features.
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